On the 23rd of May 2017, our forces moved in to raid the safehouse of Isnilon Hapilon, the so-called Emir of ISIS in Southeast Asia. Involved in this operation were members of the Joint Special Operations Unit 3 (JSOU3) supported by the 4th Scout Ranger Company (4SRC), the 14th Division Reconnaissance Company (14DRC), and the …
When the initial security reports from Marawi City reached Moscow through Special Assistant to the President, Secretary Christopher Lawrence Go, he immediately relayed its contents to the President. The President, who was currently in a meeting with his Russian counterpart, excused himself and summoned to a closed door meeting, the Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea, his …
On May 23, 2017, majority of our forces under the operational command of the Western Mindanao Command (WesMinCom) were conducting Focused Military Operations (FMO) against communist terrorists at a distance of about 30 kilometers from Marawi City. Our forces in Marawi City consisted of a handful of soldiers, most of them were part of the …
During the Marawi crisis, we used and applied the hard power approach in fighting against the ISIS-Maute terrorists and liberating Marawi City from their clutches. As such, we created, organized, and utilized JTF Marawi for destroying this terrorist group. Our Operations Cell under Lt Col Tex Suderio integrated the hard power approach into our strategy …
FMO provided the lethal aspect of IO. These were the various capabilities that we utilized in fighting the ISIS-Maute Terrorist Group in Marawi City. We translated our tactical gains from the MBA to the information environment through the use of: print, broadcast, interactive media, and digital/social media platforms. Through these, we were able to show …
During the Marawi crisis, our government forces utilized combined arms, joint, and interagency manner against the ISIS-Maute Terrorist Group. Units with different competencies, functions, and skills performed combined arms operations in an urban terrain. In the application of combined arms in Marawi City, we relied on the: synergy, synchronization, coordination, and integration of different maneuver, …
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Our application of the soft power approach during the crisis won the hearts and minds of the nation. It was manifested through the tremendous outpouring of support that we received from the affected communities and the general public. With the overwhelming support of the public, the legitimacy of our military operations against the ISIS-Maute Terrorist …
We were able to physically and psychologically contain the MBA in Marawi City. While our troops on the ground were providing the physical means to contain the battlefield, our use of Information Operations (IO) became vital in containing it psychologically. IO utilized both hard power and soft power approaches through different Information Related Capabilities (IRC). …
The Marawi crisis affected the displaced civilians physically, psychologically, emotionally, and socially. The people of Marawi City suffered a great loss – death and injury; damage to personal property, cultural and religious structures; loss of livelihood and income; and a disruption of business and education. They were also confronted by the appalling living conditions in …
We envisioned CVE programs to foster a closer cooperation and exchange between us and actors in the fields of conflict management and prevention. COL FACUNDO PALAFOX IV, G7, PA provided us with his guidance, directives, and support in the conduct of our operations. We purposely engaged the youth sector as they are the most vulnerable …