No one wants terrorists

No one wants to fight a war on their own shores. No one wants terrorists to gain a foothold in their own country. The Battle of Marawi was not expected. When we found out that Isnilon Hapilon was in a safehouse at Bgy Basak, Malutlot, Marawi City, on the 23rd of May 2017, soldiers raided…

Humanity and War

What happened in Marawi City may be a portent of things to come in the realm of global terrorism. The Philippine Army must put extra effort on developing and enhancing its capabilities and competence in order to be able to respond adequately should a need arise. Although the ISIS–Maute Terrorist Group was defeated in the…

Raid to Capture Hapilon

On the 23rd of May 2017, our government forces moved in to raid the safehouse of Isnilon Hapilon, the so-called Emir of ISIS in Southeast Asia. Involved in this operation were members of the Joint Special Operations Unit 3 (JSOU3) supported by the 4th Scout Ranger Company (4SRC), the 14th Division Reconnaissance Company (14DRC), and…

Addressing the Crisis

On May 23, 2017, majority of our forces under the operational command of the Western Mindanao Command (WesMinCom) were conducting Focused Military Operations (FMO) against communist terrorists at a distance of about 30 kilometers from Marawi City. Our forces in Marawi City consisted of a handful of soldiers, most of them were part of the…

Declaration of Martial Law

When the initial security reports from Marawi City reached Moscow through Special Assistant to the President, Secretary Christopher Lawrence Go, he immediately relayed its contents to the President. The President, who was currently in a meeting with his Russian counterpart, excused himself and summoned to a closed door meeting, the Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea, his…

Hard Power Approach

During the Marawi crisis, we used and applied the hard power approach in fighting against the ISIS-Maute terrorists and liberating Marawi City from their clutches. As such, we created, organized, and utilized JTF Marawi for destroying this terrorist group. Our Operations Cell under Lt Col Tex Suderio integrated the hard power approach into our strategy…

Combined Arms, Joint, and Interagency Operations

During the Marawi crisis, our government forces utilized combined arms, joint, and interagency manner against the ISIS-Maute Terrorist Group. Units with different competencies, functions, and skills performed combined arms operations in an urban terrain. In the application of combined arms in Marawi City, we relied on the: synergy, synchronization, coordination, and integration of different maneuver,…

Soft Power Approach

Our application of the soft power approach during the crisis won the hearts and minds of the nation. It was manifested through the tremendous outpouring of support that we received from the affected communities and the general public. With the overwhelming support of the public, the legitimacy of our military operations against the ISIS-Maute Terrorist…

Countering Violent Extremism

We envisioned CVE programs to foster a closer cooperation and exchange between us and actors in the fields of conflict management and prevention. COL FACUNDO PALAFOX IV, G7, PA provided us with his guidance, directives, and support in the conduct of our operations. We purposely engaged the youth sector as they are the most vulnerable…